

Chief, EE
ATTN: ☐
Chief, FHB

APR 10 1953

INFO: COM, Frankfurt

Operational/CALL

KIBITZ-15

REF : (1) EGQW-5711, March 27, 1953
(2) SFRAN 3178, March 26, 1953
(3) DIR 47849, April 1, 1953
(4) DIR 48286, April 3, 1953

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AUTH: DE 102
DATE: 5/18/1 REVIEWER: ()

1. This dispatch concerns itself only with subject's proposed role in the REDCAP field. Proposals concerning the Stay-Behind field generally and the close out of the major portions of subject's Stay-Behind net are being forwarded in separate communications.

2. I sincerely regret that Headquarters and the field have become involved in a papier-krieg over this affair. I am positive that any points of dissension could be straightened out in thirty minutes if the principals concerned met face to face. You have not yet, however, really had the full benefit of our thinking. Regardless of the eventual outcome, it seems appropriate to make this a matter of record.

3. Let's consider first the relative sensitivity of a Stay-Behind program as opposed to a program designed to induce the defection of Russian officials. The first, I am sure we agree, and recent history has proven, must be mounted in complete secrecy. Any compromise brings intolerable reaction. Of all the projects charged to FHB, I consider Stay-Behind activities second only to penetration of the Federal Government in "sensitivity".

4. Defection inducement is a somewhat different story. Both General Clay and Mr. McCloy have expounded our asylum policy. Every ZIPPER agent knows we want Russian officers. RIAS, RFE and even the Voice skirt the edge of outright inducement. The ☐ when they can get their radio to work, broadcast direct defection inducement material and distribute leaflets on this theme. Can there be any question in anyone's mind that the Russians know we are engaging in this activity?

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DIST:

3-EE

4-COM (DCOM-REDCAP)

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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5. This does not mean that operations in the defection field should not be securely conducted. They must be. Can subject conduct them securely? He can. This is our considered opinion, based not only on the material available to you but, in this case, on a broader opportunity for evaluation in the field than at home.

6. So far as we know your concern over subject as an agent stems from (a) review of the old KIBITZ files, (b) the [] survey, (c) your discussions with [] and []. Please remember in this connection that many of Agent's early sloppy habits are at least in some part attributable to Headquarters suggestions that he not be specifically guided and controlled (and he had no prior trade-craft experience as an Abwehr or Gestapo agent to draw from); that although [] criticized the security and lack of control in subject's old program, he still recommended (under Sec. V of his paper) that "KIBITZ 15's" talent as an organizer could be put to good use by letting him set up a net in the East Zone ([] was considerably more enthusiastic in his spoken praise of the high qualities of the Agent); and finally that []'s and []'s opinion of the Agent, is exactly counter-balanced by []'s and []'s.

7. Without, then, getting into any debate over the validity of presentation of the charges contained in Para. 2, of Ref. 1, the question largely resolves itself into one of control, since with firm control, security follows. The acid test on control came, I believe, with the presentation to the Agent on 2 April of the statement to be signed by him (Para. 2, Ref. 3) recognizing we were making no commitment on his final resettlement or would intercede regarding his efforts to obtain a German Army position. Although it is obvious Headquarters realized a statement renouncing resettlement would be virtually impossible to obtain in the average case, we sought the advice of the Mission Legal Officer to provide even more protection for the Government and a greater control factor. After all, you had only our word that the Agent was now under control. Except for objecting to the German construction used in the version presented him, the Agent signed without a whimper. The document has been forwarded under separate cover to the Fifth Contact Report. I hope and believe it will convince you of our sincerity of presentation over the control question.

8. With regard to Para. 7 of Ref. 1, I can assure you there was no sinister motive in the timing of EGFA-850. [] approved the proposal to sound out the Agent on REDCAP on 14 February, a Saturday, I wrote the dispatch on 16 February, the following Monday, and it came out of the paper mill on the 17th. We could only guess at that time whether the Agent would be either qualified or interested in a REDCAP operation. Considering he had a full operational clearance for Stay-Behind work, it did not occur to us that Headquarters would object to

employing him in the REDCAP field on a provisional basis if such an arrangement promised to be productive. The action patently was normal, it is standard practice in the German Mission to begin operations when approval of COM or his designee has been received, providing there are no adverse security factors. If you are questioning this procedure, that is one thing, but signalling out this operation for criticism by insinuating that Headquarters was "purposely circumvented" is quite another.

9. With regard to Para. 11, of Ref. 1, I have made no promise, by implication or otherwise, that we would help this Agent get integrated into the German Army. I have faced up to discussing with him the question of his status, rather than merely speculating about it as has been the practice in the past. You will, I am sure, be reassured to know that he has no desire of any sort for us to intercede in getting him made a Colonel or Brigadier General in the upcoming German contingent. In the first place, he is in a much better position than we to achieve this, if such is his ultimate aim. When he states, however, that he doesn't care "whether he is a big General in Bonn or a little man someplace else, as long as he is doing a worthwhile job", he sounds convincing.

10. Despite the allegation contained in Para. 1 of Ref. 3, we had not obligated ourselves to the point where we could not have prepared to withdraw smoothly at the 2 April contact. We were and are, of course, considerably more interested in staging a successful operation than in withdrawing. Frankly, I interpreted your message of 1 April as an approval, subject to meeting the conditions prescribed in Para. 2--which was done. Perhaps I was mistaken in assuming consideration of a POC would be based only on security factors after the policy decision had been made (in Ref. 3) to go ahead with the operation. In any event, the content and timing of Ref. 4, refusing any POC or trial period, was respectively most startling and unfortunate. Why was Ref. 4 not dispatched until 3 April when Headquarters knew from our cable of 26 March (Ref. 2) that we were meeting the Agent on 2 April and could begin operations immediately after if Headquarters reacted favorably? Only Ref. 3 was received before the 2 April contact.

11. Finally, I am disturbed by some of the questions being posed about the Agent at home, as reported informally. It appears some loose allegations are being made. Let's set the record straight:

Q. Is he a Nazi?

A. He is not, and never was.

Q. Was he in the SS?

A. No, but was detailed to the SS for varying period of time.

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- Q. Is he anti-semitic? A. Yes, but not rabidly so.
- Q. Is he nationalistic? A. Yes. Not to the degree, however, of other Germans with whom we work. Two examples--Dr. Globke,
[]
- Q. Is he anti-communistic? A. Completely.
- Q. Is he working for money or for ideological reasons. A. For ideological reasons.

12. We can phase this Agent out, if such is the final decision, and we can do it without paying him any large sum of money, as suggested by Ref. 1, or finding other employment for him, or suggesting he recontact Blank. If we do phase him out, he's not going to give us any trouble. He will spend the rest of his life speculating about the Americans who picked up a volunteer, played around for two and a half years and then for no apparent reason booted him out, but that, of course, is beside the point. More to the point is an effective operation. We have a large mechanism over here devoted to processing Russian defectors. They are getting few customers and no induced defectors. If anyone can start producing bodies for this mill, I'm convinced this man can. We have asked for a three-month period to give the operation a try; you at first agreed under most stringent but acceptable conditions (Ref. 3) and then reneged (Ref. 4) on the basis of an "impartial presentation". Reviewing the communications exchange so far, we naturally wonder how the field viewpoint could have been appropriately represented.

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